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Abstract
Reinforcement learning models address animal’s behavioral adaptation to its
changing “external” environment, and are based on the assumption that Pavlo-
vian, habitual and goal-directed responses seek to maximize reward acquisition.
Negative-feedback models of homeostatic regulation, on the other hand, are con-
cerned with behavioral adaptation in response to the “internal” state of the animal,
and assume that animals’ behavioral objective is to minimize deviations of some
key physiological variables from their hypothetical setpoints. Building upon the
drive-reduction theory of reward, we propose a new analytical framework that in-
tegrates learning and regulatory systems, such that the two seemingly unrelated
objectives of reward maximization and physiological-stability prove to be identi-
cal. The proposed theory shows behavioral adaptation to both internal and external
states in a disciplined way. We further show that the proposed framework allows
for a unified explanation of some behavioral pattern like motivational sensitivity
of different associative learning mechanism, anticipatory responses, interaction
among competing motivational systems, and risk aversion.
1 Introduction
“Reinforcement learning” and “negative-feedback models of homeostatic regulation” are two con-
trol theory-based computational frameworks that have had major contributions in learning and mo-
tivation literatures in behavioral psychology, respectively.
Proposing neurobiologically-plausible algorithms, computational theory of reinforcement learning
(RL) explains how animals adapt their behavior to varying contingencies in their “external” envi-
ronment, through persistently updating their estimates of the rewarding value of feasible choices
[1]. The teaching signal required for these updates is suggested to be carried by phasic activity of
midbrain dopamine neurons [2] projecting to the striatum, where stimulus-response associations are
supposed to be encoded. Critically, this theory is built upon one hypothetical assumption: animals
behavioral objective is to maximize reward acquisition. In this respect, without addressing the ques-
tion of how the brain constructs reward, the RL theory gives a normative explanation for how the
brains decision making circuitry shapes instrumental responses as a function of external cues, so as
the animal to satisfy its reward-maximization objective.
Negative-feedback models of homeostatic regulation (HR), on the other hand, seek to explain regu-
lar variabilities in behavior as a function of the internal state of the animal, when the external stimuli
are fixed [3, 4]. Homeostasis means maintaining stable of some physiological variables. Corre-
spondingly, behavioral homeostasis refers to corrective responses that are triggered by deviation of
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a regulated variable from its hypothetical setpoint. In fact, regulatory systems operate “as if” they
aim at defending variables against perturbations. In this sense, existence of an “error signal” (also
known as “negative feedback”), defined by the discrepancy between the current and desired internal
state, is essential for any regulatory mechanism.
Even though the presence of this negative feedback in controlling motivated behaviors is argued to be
indisputable for explaining some behavioral and physiological facts [3], three major difficulties have
raised criticism against negative-feedback models of behavioral homeostasis [3, 5]: (1) Anticipatory
eating and drinking can be elicited in the absence of physiological depletion [6], supposedly in
order to prevent anticipated deviations in future. In more general terms, motivated behaviors are
observed to be elicited even when no negative feedback is detectable. (2) Intravenous (and even
intragastric, in some cases) injection of food is not motivating, even though it alleviates deviation of
the motivational state from its homeostatic setpoint. For example, rats do not show motivation, after
several learning trials, to run down an alley for intragastric feeding by milk, whereas they quickly
learn to run for normal drinking of milk [7]. These behavioral patterns are used as evidence to
argue that maintaining homeostasis (reducing the negative feedback) is not a behavioral objective.
In contrast, taste (and other sensory) information of stimuli is argued to be the key factor for their
reinforcing properties [5]. (3) The traditional homeostatic regulation theory simply assumes that the
animal knows how to translate its various physiological deficits into the appropriate behaviors. In
fact, without taking into account the contextual state of the animal, negative feedback models only
address the question of whether or not the animal should have motivation toward a certain outcome,
without answering how the outcome can be achieved through a series of instrumental actions.
The existence of these shortcomings calls for rethinking the traditional view toward homeostatic
regulation theory. We believe that these shortcomings, as well as the weak spot of RL models in
not taking into account the internal drive state of the animal, all arise from lack of an integrated
view toward learning and motivation. We show in this paper that a simple unified computational
theory for RL and HR allows for explaining a wide range of behavioral patterns including those
mentioned above, without decreasing the explanatory power of the two original theories. We further
show that such a unified theory can satisfy the two objectives of reward maximization and deviation
minimization at the same time.
2 The model
The term “reward” (with many equivalents like reinforcer, motivational salience, utility, etc.) has
been at the very heart of behavioral psychology since its foundation. In purely behavioral terms, it
refers to a stimulus delivered to the animal after a response is made, that increases the probability
of making that response in the future. RL theory proposes algorithms for how different learning
systems can adapt agent’s responses to varying external conditions in order to maximize the acquisi-
tion of reward. For this purpose, RL algorithms try to learn, via experiences, the sum of discounted
rewards expected to be received after taking a specific action (at), in a specific state (st), onward.
V (st; at) = E

rt + rt+1 + 
2rt+2 + : : : jst; at

= E
" 1X
i=t
i trijst; at
#
(1)
0    1 discounts future rewards. rt denotes the rewarding value of the outcome the animal
receives at time t, which is a often set to a “fixed” value that can be either positive or negative,
depending on whether the corresponding stimulus is appetitive or aversive, respectively. However,
animals motivation for outcomes is not fixed, but a function of their internal state: a food pellet is
more rewarding to a hungry, than a sated rat. In fact, the internal state (also referred to as drive, or
motivational state) of the animal affects the reinforcing value of a constant external outcome.
As an attempt to identify the nature of reward and its relation to drive states, neo-behaviorists like
Hull [8], Spence, and Mowrer have proposed the “drive reduction” theory of motivation. According
to this theory, one primary mechanism underlying reward is drive reduction. In terms of homeostatic
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regulation theory, reward is defined as a stimulus that reduces the discrepancy between the current
and the desired drive state of the animal, i.e, food pellet is rewarding to a hungry rat because it
fulfills a physiological need.
To capture this idea formally, let’s Ht = fh1;t; h2;t; ::; hN;tg denote the physiological state of the
animal at time t, and H = fh1; h2; ::; hNg as the homeostatic setpoint. As a special case, fig-
ure 1 shows a simplified system where food and water constitute all the physiological needs. This
model can obviously be extended, without loss of generality, to cover other homeostatically regu-
lated drives, as well as more detailed aspects of feeding like differential drives for carbohydrate,
sodium, calcium, etc. A drive function can then be defined on this space as a mapping from physio-
Figure 1: An examplary homeostatic space, with food and water as regulated physiological needs
logical state to motivation:
d(Ht) =
m
vuut NX
i=1
jhi   hi;tjn (2)
This drive function is in fact a distance function (Euclidian distance whenm = n = 2) that creates
some quasi-circle iso-drive curves centred around the homeostatic setpoint. The homeostatic space,
as a multidimensional metric space, is a hypothetical construct that allow us to explain a wide range
of behavioral and physiological evidence in a unified framework. Since animals physiological states
are most often below the setpoint, our focus in this paper is mostly on the quarter of the homeostatic
space that is below the homeostatic setpoint.
Having defined drive, we can now provide a formal definition for reward, based on the drive reduc-
tion theory. Assume that as the result of some actions, the animal receives an outcome at time t
that contains ki;t units of the constituent hi, for each i 2 f1; 2; ::; Ng. Kt can be defined as a row
vector with entries (ki;t : i 2 f1; 2; ::; Ng). Consumption of that outcome will result in a transition
of the physiological state from Ht to Ht+1 = Ht +Kt, and consequently, a transition of the drive
state from d(Ht) to d(Ht +Kt). For example, figure 1 shows the transition resulted from taking k1
units of food. Accordingly, the rewarding value of that outcome can be defined as the consequent
reduction in the drive function:
r(Ht;Kt) = d(Ht)  d(Ht+1) = d(Ht)  d(Ht +Kt) (3)
This drive-reduction definition of reward is the central element in our proposed framework that will
bridge the gap between regulatory and reward learning systems.
3 Behavioral plausibility of the reward function
Before discussing how the reward defined in equation 3 can be used by associative learning mecha-
nisms (RL theory), we are interested in this section to show that the functional form proposed for the
reward function allows for several behavioral phenomena to be explained in a unified framework.
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For all m > n > 2, the rewarding value of an outcome consisting of only one constituent,
Kt = (0; 0; ::; kj;t; ::; 0) ,when the animal is in the motivational state Ht, will have the four be-
low properties. Even though these properties are written for the cases that the need state remains
below the setpoint, as the drive function is symmetric in respect to the setpoint, similar result can be
derived for other three quarters.
3.1 Reward value increases with the dose of outcome
The reward function is an increasing function of the magnitude of the outcome (e.g., number of food
pellets); i.e. the bigger the outcome is, the more rewarding value it will have. It is straightforward
to show that:
dr(Ht;Kt)
dkj;t
> 0 : for kj;t > 0 (4)
Supporting this property of the drive function, it is shown in progressive ratio schedules that rats
maintain higher breakpoints when reinforced with bigger appetitive outcomes, reflecting higher mo-
tivation toward them [9, 10].
3.2 Excitatory effect of deprivation level
Increasing the deprivation level of the animal will increase the reinforcing strength of a constant
dose of a corresponding outcome, i.e. a single pellet of food is more rewarding to a hungry, than a
sated rate.
dr(Ht;Kt)
djhj   hj;tj
> 0 : for kj;t > 0 (5)
Consistently, the level of food deprivation in rats is demonstrated to increases the breakpoint in
progressive ratio schedules [10].
3.3 Inhibitory effect of the irrelevant drive
A large body of behavioral experiments shows that deprivation level for one need has an inhibitory
effect on the reinforcing value of outcomes that satisfy irrelevant needs. (see [11] for review). It is
well known that high levels of irrelevant thirst impairs Pavlovian as well as instrumental responses
for food during both acquisition and extinction. Reciprocally, food deprivation is demonstrated to
suppress Pavlovian and instrumental water-related responses. As some other examples, increased
calcium appetite is shown to reduce appetite for phosphorus, and increased level of hunger is demon-
strated to inhibit sexual behavior. It is straightforward to show that the specific functional form
proposed for the drive function can capture this inhibitory-like interaction between irrelevant drives:
dr(Ht;Kt)
djhi   hi;tj
< 0 : for all i 6= j and kj;t > 0 (6)
Intuitively, one does not play chess, or even search for sex, with an empty stomach. This behav-
ioral pattern can be interpreted as competition among different motivational systems (different di-
mensions of the homeostatic space), and is consistent with the notion of “complementary” relation
between some goods in economics, like between cake and coffee. Each of two complement goods
are highly rewarding, only when the other one is also available; and taking one good when the other
one is lacking, is not that rewarding.
3.4 Risk aversion
Risk aversion, as a fundamental concept in both psychology and economics, and supported by a
wealth of behavioral experiments, is defined by reluctance of individuals to select choices with
uncertain outcomes, compared to choices with more certain payoffs, even when the expected payoff
of the former is higher than that of the latter. It is easy to show that a concave reward (utility) function
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(in respect to the quantity of the outcome), is equivalent to risk aversion. It is due to this feature
that concavity of the utility function has become a fundamental assumption in the microeconomic
theory. The proposed form of the drive function can capture risk-aversion:
d2r(Ht;Kt)
dk2j;t
< 0 : for kj;t > 0 (7)
It is noteworthy that as Kt consists of substances that fulfil physiological needs, one should be
careful in extending this and other features of the model to the case of monetary rewards, or any
other type of stimuli that does not seem to have a corresponding regulatory system (like social
rewards, novelty-induced reward, etc.).
It is clear that the four mentioned properties of the reward function depend on the specific functional
form adopted for the drive function (equation 2). In fact, the drive-reduction definition of reward
allows for the validity of the form of drive function to be experimentally tested in behavioral tasks.
4 Homeostatic control through learning mechanisms
Despite significant day-to-day variations in energy expenditure and food availability, the homeo-
static regulation system involved in control of food-intake and energy balance is a remarkably pre-
cise system. This adaptive nature of homeostatic regulation system can be achieved by employing
the animals learning mechanisms, which are capable of adopting flexible behavioral strategies to
cope with changes in the environmental conditions. In this section we are interested in looking at
behavioral and theoretical implications of interaction between homeostatic regulation and reward
learning systems.
One theoretical implication of the proposed definition of reward is that it reconciles the RL and
homeostatic regulation theories, in terms of normative assumptions behind them. In more precise
words, if any reward learning system, like RL algorithms, uses the drive-reduction definition of re-
ward proposed in equation 3, then a behavioral policy that maximizes the sum of discounted rewards
is at the same time minimizing the sum of discounted drives (or sum of discounted deviations from
the setpoint), and vice versa (see Supplementary Methods: Proposition 1). In this respect, reward
maximization can be seen as just means that guide animal’s behavior toward satisfying the more
basic objective of maintaining homeostasis.
Since the reward function defined by equation 3 depends on the internal state and thus, is non-
stationary, some appropriate adjustments in the classical RL algorithms that try to find an optimal
policy must be thought of. One straightforward solution is to define an augmented Markov de-
cision process (MDP) implied by the cross-product of internal and external states, an then use a
variant of RL algorithms to learn action-values in that problem-space. Consistent with this view,
some behavioral studies show that internal state can work in the same way that external state works.
That is, animals are able to acquire responses conditioned upon some certain motivational states
(e.g. motivational state induced by benzodiazepine agonist) [11]. Although this approach, in the-
ory, guarantees convergence to the optimal policy, high dimensionality of the resulting state-space
makes learning rather impossible in practice. Moreover, since the next external state only depends on
the current external but not internal state, such an augmented MDP will have significant redundant
structure. From a machine learning point of view, as argued in [12], an appropriate function approx-
imator specifically designed to take advantage of such a structure can be used to reduce state-space
dimensionality.
Beside this algorithm-independent expansion of state-space argued above, the proposed definition
of reward provides an opportunity for discussing how different associate learning systems in the
brain take the animal’s internal state into account. Here we discuss motivational sensitivity in ha-
bitual (hypothesized to use a model-free RL, like temporal difference algorithm [13]), goal-directed
(hypothesized to use a model-based RL [13]), and Pavlovian learning systems.
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A model-based RL algorithm learns the state-transition matrix (action-outcome contingencies), as
well as the reward function (the incentive value of each outcome), and then uses them to compute the
value of possible actions in a given state, using Bellman optimality equation[1]. In our framework,
as long as a model-based algorithm is involved in decision making, all that the animal needs to
do when its internal state shifts is to update the incentive value (reward function) of each potential
outcome. The reward function being updated, the animal will be able to take the optimal policy,
given that the state-transition function is learned completely. In order to update the reward function,
one way is that the animal re-experiences outcomes in its new motivational state. This way seems
to be how the goal-directed system works, since re-exposure is demonstrated to be necessary in
order for the animals’ behavior to be sensitive to changes in motivational state [11]. The second
way is to update the reward function without re-exposure, but through directly estimating the drive-
reduction effect of outcomes in the current motivational state, using equation 3. This way seems to
be how the Pavlovian system works, since numerous experiments show that Pavlovian conditioned
or unconditioned responses are sensitive to the internal state in an outcome-specific way, without re-
exposure being required [11]. This Pavlovian-type behavioral adaptation is observed even when the
animal has never experienced the outcome in its current motivational state during its whole life. This
shows that animals are able to directly estimate the drive-reduction effect of at least some certain
types of outcomes. Furthermore, the fact that this motivational sensitivity is outcome-specific shows
that the underlying associative learning structure is model-based (i.e. based on learning the causal
contingencies between events).
The habitual system (hypothesized to use a model-free RL[13]) is demonstrated, through outcome-
devaluation experiments, that cannot directly (i.e. without new learning) adapt the animal’s behav-
ioral response after shifts in the motivational state [11]. It might be concluded from this observation
that action-values in the habitual system only depend on the internal state of the animal during the
course of learning (past experiences), but not performance. This is consistent with the information
storage scheme in model-free RL, where cached action-values lose connection with the identity of
the outcomes. Thus, the habitual system doesn’t know what specific action-values should be updated
when a novel internal state is being experienced.
However, it has been argued by some authors [14] that even though habitual responses are insensitive
to sensory-specific satiety, they are sensitive to motivational manipulations in a general, outcome-
independent way. Note that the previous form of motivational insensitivity concerns lack of behav-
ioral adaptation in an outcome-specific way (for example, lack of greater preference for food-seeking
behavior, compared to water-seeking behavior, after a shift from satiety to hunger state). Borrow-
ing from the Hullian concept of “generalized drive” [8], it has been proposed that transition from
an outcome-sated to an outcome-deprived motivational state will energize all pre-potent habitual
responses, irrespective of whether or not those actions result in that certain outcome [14]. For exam-
ple, a motivational shift from satiety to hunger will result in energization of both food-seeking and
water-seeking habitual responses.
Taking a normative perspective, we argue here that this outcome-independent energizing effect is
an approximate way of updating the value of state-action pairs when the motivational state shifts
instantaneously. Assuming that the animal is trained under the fixed internal state H0, and then
tested in a novel internal state H1, the cached values in the habitual system can be approximated in
the new motivational state by:
Q1(s; a) =
d(H1)
d(H0)
:Q0(s; a) : for all state-action pairs (8)
Where Q0(s; a) represents action-values learned by the habitual system after the training period.
According to this update rule, all the prepotent actions will get energized if deviation from the
homeostatic setpoint increases in the new internal state, whether or not the outcome of those actions
are more desired in the new state. Proposition 2 (see Supplementary Methods) shows that this update
rule is a perfect approximation only whenH1 = c:H0, where c  0. This means that the energizing
effect will result in rational behavior after motivational shift, only when the new internal state is an
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amplification or abridge of the old internal state in all the dimension of the homeostatic space, with
equal magnitude. Since the model-free system does not learn the causal model of the environment, it
cannot show motivational sensitivity in an outcome-specific way, and this general energizing effect
is the best approximate way to react to motivational manipulations.
4.1 Anticipatory responses
The notion of predictive homeostasis [3, 4], as opposed to the classical reactive homeostasis where
the existence of negative feedback (physiological depletion) is essential, suggests that through an-
ticipating future needs, individuals make anticipatory responses in order to prevent deviation of
regulated variables from their setpoints. Anticipatory eating and drinking, as two examples, are
defined by taking food and water in the absence of any detectable decrease in the corresponding
physiological signals.
Although it is quite clear that explaining such behavioral patterns requires integrating homeostatic
mechanisms and learning (as predictive) processes, to our knowledge, no well-defined mechanism
has been proposed for it so far. We show here, through an example, how the proposed model
can reconcile anticipatory responses to the homeostatic regulation theory. Temperature regulation
provides a clear example for predictive homeostasis.
Body temperature, which has long been a topic of interest in the homeostatic regulation literature,
is shown to increase back to its normal level by shivering, after the animal is placed into a cold
place. Interestingly, cues that predict being placed into a cold place induce anticipatory shivering
and result in the body temperature to go above the normal temperature of the animal [15]. Similarly,
cues that predict receiving a drug that decreases body temperature is shown to have the same effect.
This behavior is interpreted as an attempt by the animal to alleviate the severity of deviation from
the setpoint.
To model this example, lets assume that x is the normal temperature of the animal, and that putting
the animal in the cold place will result in a decrease of lx units in the body temperature. Furthermore,
assume that when presented with the coldness-predicting cue (SC), the animal chooses how much
to shiver and thus, increases its body temperature by kx units. In a scenario like this, after observing
the coldness-predicting cue, the animals temperature will shift from x to x + kx, as a result of
anticipatory shivering. Assuming that the animal will then experience coldness after a delay of one
time-unit, its temperature will transit from x + kx to x + kx   lx. The rewarding value of this
transition will be discounted with the rate of . Finally, by assuming that after one more time-unit
the body temperature will go back to the normal level, x, the animal will receive another reward,
discounted with the rate of 2. The sum of discounted rewards can be written as below:
V (SC ; kX) = [d(x
) d(x+kX)]+:[d(x+kX) d(x+kX lX)]+2:[d(x+kX lX) d(x)]
(9)
Proposition 3 (see Supplementary Methods) shows that the optimal strategy for maximizing the
sum of discounted rewards in this scenario is when kx = lx=2, assuming that the discount factor
is not equal to one, but is sufficiently close to it. In fact, the model predicts that the best strategy
is to perform anticipatory shivering to the extent that keep it as close as possible to the setpoint:
turning around but close to the setpoint is preferred to getting far from it and coming back. In fact
this example, which can be easily generalized to anticipatory eating and drinking, shows that when
learning mechanisms play a regulatory role, it is not only the initial and final motivational states of a
policy that matters, but also the trajectory of the motivational state in the homeostatic space through
that policy matters. It is in fact due to discounting future rewards. If the discount factor is one, then
regardless of the trajectory of the motivational state, the sum of rewards for all policies that start
from a certain homeostatic point and finish at another point, will be equal. In that case, the sum of
rewards for all values of kx in the anticipatory shivering example will be zero and thus, anticipatory
strategies will not be preferred to a reactive-homeostasis strategy. In fact, the model predicts that
decreasing animal’s discount rate (e.g. through pharmacological agents known to modulate discount
rate) should increase the probability that the animal show an anticipatory response, and vice versa.
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5 Discussion
Despite considerable differences, some common principles are argued to govern all motivational
systems. we have proposed a model that captures some of these commonalities between homoestat-
ically regulated motivational systems. We showed how the rewarding value of an outcome can be
computed as a function of the animal’s internal state and the constituting elements of the outcome,
through the drive reduction equation. We further demonstrated how this computed reward can be
used by different learning mechanisms to form appropriate Pavlovian or instrumental associations.
However, it should be noted that concerning food (and other ingestible) outcomes, the basic form of
the drive-reduction definition of reward (equation 2) has four interrelated problems, some of them
used traditionally to criticize the drive reduction theory: (1) Post-digestive nutritive feedback of
food, defined by the drive reduction equation, might occur hours after ingestion. Such a long delay
between an instrumental response and its consequent drive reduction effect (reward) would make it
difficult for an appropriate association to be established. In fact, according to the temporal contiguity
rule of associative learning, unconditioned stimuli must follow immediately the conditioned stimuli,
for an association to be established between them. (2) Dopamine neurons, which are supposed to
carry reward learning signal, are demonstrated to show instantaneous burst activity in response to
unexpected food rewards, without waiting for the food to be digested, and drive to be reduced [16].
(3) Intravenous injection (and intragastric intubation, in some cases) of food is not rewarding, even
though its drive reduction effect is equal to when that food is ingested orally. As mentioned before,
oral ingestion of the same outcome is shown to have significant reinforcing effect [7]. (4) Palatable
foods have reinforcing effect, even when they do not have any nutritional value (i.e. they do not
reduce any physiological need) [16]. Making the story even more complicated, this taste-dependent
rewarding value of food is demonstrated to be modulated by not only the approximated nutritional
content of the food, but also the internal physiological state of the animal [16].
However, assuming that taste and other sensory properties of a food outcome give an estimate, ^k1;t,
of its true nutritional content, k1;t, the rewarding effect of food can be approximated by equation 3, as
soon as the food is sensed, or taken. This association between sensory information and post-ingestive
effects of food might have been established through learning, or evolution. This simple plausible
assumption clearly resolves the four problems listed above for the classical notion of drive reduction.
It explains that gastric, olfactory, or visual information of food is necessary for its reinforcing effect
to be induced and thus, intravenous injection of food is not reinforcing due to lack of appropriate
sensory information. Moreover, there is no delay in this mechanism between food intake and its
drive-reduction effect and therefore, Dopamine neurons can respond instantaneously. Finally, as
equation 3 predicts, this taste-dependent rewarding value is modulated by the motivational state of
the animal.
Previous computational accounts in the psychological literature attempting to incorporate internal-
state dependence of motivation into the RL models use ad hoc addition or multiplication of drive
state with the a priori reward magnitude [17, 13]. In the machine learning literature, among others,
Bersini [18] uses an RL model where the agent gets punished if its internal state transgresses a
predefined viability zone. Simulation results show that such a setting motivates the agent to maintain
its internal variables in a bounded zone. A more recent work [12] also uses RL framework where
reward is generated by drive difference. It is demonstrated that this design allows the agent to make
a balance in satisfying different drives. Apart from physiological and behavioral plausibility, the
theoretical novelty of our proposed framework is in formalizing the hypothetical concept of drive, as
a mapping from physiological to motivational state. This has allowed the model to show analytically
that reward maximization and deviation minimization can be seen as two sides of the same coin.
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